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This essay proposes and defends a pluralistic theory of conceptual embodiment. Our concepts
are represented in at least two ways: (i) through sensorimotor simulations of our interactions
with objects and events and (ii) through sensorimotor simulations of natural language processing.
Linguistic representations are “dis-embodied” in the sense that they are dynamic and multimodal
but, in contrast to other forms of embodied cognition, do not inherit semantic content from this
embodiment. The capacity to store information in the associations and inferential relationships
among linguistic representations extends our cognitive reach and provides an explanation of our
ability to abstract and generalize.This theory is supported by a number of empirical considerations,
including the large body of evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology
supporting a multiple semantic code explanation of imageability effects.
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Introduction
In this essay, I propose and defend a new take on a familiar idea. The
familiar idea is that our concepts are encoded in at least two general types of semantic representations: one type that is perception
and motor based and another that is language based (Paivio, 1971,
1986). Although most concepts employ both types of representations, abstract concepts tend to depend more on linguistic representations than concrete concepts do. What separates my version
of this idea from most previous ones is that I develop it within an
embodied approach to cognition (although see Barsalou et al., 2008;
Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2008 for related yet distinct views).
My defense of this new take has three parts. The first part outlines and motivates an embodied approach to concepts based on
simulation. The second part examines a challenge that faces any
form of embodied cognition: the problem of abstraction. After
making the observation that the symbolic structure of language is
well suited to solving this problem, I propose that language should
be seen as a form of what I refer to as “dis-embodied” cognition.
What I mean by this is that linguistic representations are embodied in the neurophysiological sense that they rely on sensorimotor
simulation but, unlike other embodied forms of cognition, they
do not inherit semantic content from this fact. They do, however,
accrue semantic content through their associations and inferential
relationships with other linguistic representations. The third part
surveys empirical evidence that supports the existence of separate
semantic codes.

Embodied Concepts
Historically, cognitive scientists have presumed that higher cognitive processes are carried out by computations involving amodal
mental representations (i.e., representations that are not located
within a sensorimotor modality). The precise nature of these representations was a matter of some debate. For instance, a great deal
of controversy has surrounded the issue of how language-like they
might be (Fodor, 1975). The presumption of amodality, however,
went largely unquestioned. The strength of this presumption was
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clearly demonstrated by the heated nature of the debate concerning the possibility that analog perceptual representations might be
employed in mental imagery tasks (Pylyshyn, 1973, 1981; Kosslyn
and Shwartz, 1977). Now, there is general agreement that behavioral
and neural evidence suggests that mental imagery (Kosslyn, 1994)
and motor imagery (Jeannerod, 1995; Grèzes and Decety, 2001)
depend on sensory and motor representations respectively.
Within the last two decades, a growing number of researchers
and philosophers have argued that cognitive science needs to reorient itself with respect to its fundamental assumptions about the
nature of mind and cognition. These researchers and philosophers
contend that cognitive processes need to be viewed as fundamentally based in our bodily interactions with the world. Clark (1998,
p. 506) expresses this view clearly in his economical assertion that,
“Biological brains are first and foremost the control systems for
biological bodies.” The idea is that we cannot hope to understand
the functioning of the brain without appreciating the central role
it plays in guiding perception and action. This view has lead to a
robust and diverse research program in which investigators examine
the possible ways in which thinking, remembering, and understanding language are shaped by the fact that we dynamically interact with our complex physical and social environment by means
of perceptual and motor capacities (Wilson, 2002). Embodied
theories of cognition often suggest that concepts are understood
via sensorimotor simulations. Neural systems that are involved in
understanding real objects, actions, and events in the world are
used to internally simulate those objects, actions, and events at
later points in time.
The theoretical promise of embodied concepts

Within cognitive science, the orthodox approach to concepts views
them as containing amodal representations. This approach posits
mental symbols that are manipulated solely based on their syntactic
properties. By assumption, there is no intrinsic connection between
these symbols and what they represent. This approach faces a wellknown challenge: the symbol grounding problem. Harnad (1990,
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p. 335) summarizes this problem with the question, “How can the
meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on
the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but
other meaningless symbols?” Perhaps the easiest way to think of
this problem is to imagine trying to learn a foreign language from
a dictionary in that language. Each word would be defined in terms
of its connections to other words. In order to avoid this problem,
the meaning of at least some mental symbols must be grounded
in something other than their syntactic properties.
A key impetus for the hypothesis that concepts are couched in
sensorimotor representations is the belief that this will help with the
symbol grounding problem. In order to see just how it might help,
we need to have a clear conception of what an embodied account
of concepts might look like. For that reason, I am going to briefly
sketch what I take to be the strongest and most developed embodied
accounts of concepts: the perceptual symbol theory (Barsalou, 1999).
I should emphasize, though, that many of the points made in this
essay extend beyond this particular theory and do not depend on its
ultimate success. A core tenet of perceptual symbol system theory is
that sensorimotor simulations of experience are of central importance to our concepts. Intuitively, the idea is that our conceptualization of a category consists of simulating the experience of perceiving
and/or acting on exemplars of that category. Such simulations are
the result of a kind of neurophysiological re-enactment: information
concerning the neural activation patterns associated with perception
or action, which has been captured and stored by conjunctive neurons in neighboring association areas or convergence zones (Damasio
and Damasio, 1994), is used later in absence of relevant input to
generate a partial reactivation of the sensorimotor representations.
Perceptual symbols have a number of properties that make them
well suited to serve as conceptual representations (Barsalou, 1999,
2003). First, simulations need not be conscious – that is, they may
contain unconscious perceptual representations (for evidence to
this effect see Pecher et al., 2009). This property removes some of the
traditional objections to imagistic theories of cognition that turn
on the unreliability or vagueness of introspection. Second, simulations will often be schematic in the sense they contain only some of
the sensorimotor representations involved in the experience being
simulated. For instance, a simulation in the visual modality of the
concept DOG might involve shape representations but not color
representations. Third, they will typically be multi-modal in the
sense that they involve the reactivation of perceptual representations
in several modalities. Fourth, perceptual symbols provide a novel
means of drawing the type/token distinction (Barsalou, 1999, 2003).
This is achieved through distinguishing simulators and simulations.
A simulator is a distributed system spanning association and sensorimotor areas. To possess a concept, such as DOG, is to have a
skill or ability to generate appropriate perceptual representations
of dogs in a given situation. An innovative aspect of Barsalou’s
account is that it holds that these simulations are context-sensitive:
simulations for a given concept vary depending on the context and
the speaker’s goals. For example, they might represent objects from
a particular perspective. Typically, simulations will involve only a
small subset of the information stored in memory.
Although I believe that simulation-based accounts of embodiment have the most empirical promise, I should acknowledge that
there are other theoretical conceptions of embodiment. Borghi
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(2005) identifies two distinct strains of embodied cognition – one
that focuses on affordances and situated action and the other that
focuses on simulation – and argues that both are true depending on the context. I am going to limit myself to the simulation
framework here for a couple of reasons. The first is that I believe
that this framework is more flexible than critics assume. An unfortunate consequence of Barsalou’s use of the term perceptual symbol
is that it gives the false impression that simulations are based in
perception and not in action mechanisms. However, nothing in
the theory prevents purely motor-based simulations. Perceptual
symbols are thus compatible with, for example, action schemas
(Glenberg and Robertson, 1999). The second reason is that I am
committed to a representational approach to concepts. One of the
issues that separate different views of embodiment is the status
of representations. Many proponents of affordances and situated
action embrace non-representational accounts of cognition – often
appealing to the promise of dynamical systems theory. Based largely
on this issue, Clark (1997) distinguishes between embodied cognitive science and radical embodied cognitive science. Clark (1997,
2008) defends the former while theorists such as Chemero (2009)
defend the latter. Siding with Clark, I assume that the notion of
representation is too useful to give up and, furthermore, that an
empirically successful theory of concepts will involve an appeal to
representations (Markman and Dietrich, 2000).
A perceptual symbol consists of a neurophysiological re-
enactment of a collection of sensorimotor representations. It
can be thought of as having perceptual content because there are
certain states of affairs in the world that would be likely to elicit
these representations under normal conditions. Barsalou argues
that this perceptual content can provide a leg up with regard to
intentional content. He writes (Barsalou, 1999, p. 597; emphasis
in the original):
Where perceptual symbols do have an advantage [over amodal
symbols] is in the ability of their content to play a heuristic role in
establishing reference. Although perceptual content is rarely definitive for intentionality, it may provide a major source of constraint
and assistance in determining what a symbol is about.

The general idea is that perceptual symbols help us refer to objects
and events because they are already causally connected with those
objects and events. This causal connection does not fully determine
the conceptual content of a perceptual symbol but it can help secure
that content.
Although embodied cognition has promise with respect to
helping with the symbol grounding problem, it seems too early to
declare victory for two reasons. The first is that it is not clear that
the problem has been fully solved (Taddeo and Floridi, 2005). The
second is that other approaches may have the conceptual resources
to address the problem. Instead of proclaiming that embodiment
solves this longstanding problem, I am going to make a weaker
and hopefully less controversial claim: the heuristic role identified
by Barsalou is an attractive design feature of perceptual symbols.
A conceptual system containing perceptual symbols can benefit
from the role that sensorimotor representations play in guiding
action and perception. To be more precise, I am going to claim
that this design feature is more beneficial with some concepts than
it is with others.

January 2011 | Volume 1 | Article 242 | 2

Dove

Empirical evidence

There is little question that embodied cognition has been a productive research program. New research seems to emerge daily. Due
to this abundance, I am only going to offer a selective review. My
purpose is not to be comprehensive but, instead, to provide general
motivation for an embodied approach to concepts.
A number of behavioral experiments support the notion that
perceptual representations are central to some cognitive tasks.
For instance, Pecher et al. (2003) found a modality-switching cost
in a linguistic task. Participants verified verbally expressed facts
involving one modality, such as the fact that leaves rustle, more
rapidly after verifying a fact involving the same modality, such as
the fact that blenders make noise, than after verifying a fact involving a different modality, such as the fact that cranberries are tart.
More recently, van Dantzig et al. (2008) found a similar modalityswitching cost between a perceptual detection task and a property
verification task. Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) asked participants to
affirm whether or not pictures depicted the actions described in
previously presented sentences. The actions had either a vertical or
horizontal orientation (such as driving a nail into a floor or into a
wall). Participants responded more quickly to the pictures that had
the same orientation as the action described. Stanfield and Zwaan
(2001) suggest that the subjects generated a perceptual image of
the action described in the sentence and then used this image to
carry out the affirmation task.
Other behavioral studies demonstrate the degree to which cognitive tasks can be interwoven with action. For instance, Borghi
et al. (2004) found a compatibility effect associated with language
processing and action. Participants were instructed to decide
whether or not a word that followed a sentence named a part of
the object mentioned in the sentence. Half of the selected parts were
found in the upper-portion of the object and half were found in
the lower-portion. The experimenters found that responses were
faster when the direction of the key press movement (upward or
downward) matched the part location (upper or lower). Further
studies indicate that the motor representations elicited by the cognitive tasks can exhibit somatotopic specificity. For instance, Scorolli
and Borghi (2007) asked their participants to judge whether or
not simple sentences containing a verb and a noun were sensible
or not and respond either by pressing a pedal or speaking into a
microphone. The verbs in the sentences referred to actions that were
typically performed with the mouth, hands, or the feet. Response
times with the microphone were fastest with “mouth-sentences”
and response times with the pedal were fastest with “foot-sentences”
(see also Scorolli et al., 2009).
Researchers have produced evidence using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) that provides compelling support for the
behavioral findings. Pulvermüller et al. (2005) carried out a TMS
study in which they found that stimulation over motor areas affects
action word processing. They weakly stimulated different parts of
the motor system while participants performed a lexical decision
task on arm- and leg-related action words. Weak stimulation of left
hemisphere areas associated with arm-movement led to an increased
response time with arm-related words in comparison with leg-related words, and the reverse pattern occurred with weak stimulation
of motor areas associated with leg-movement. Response times were
not modulated in a control condition with a sham stimulation.
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Using a different experimental paradigm, Buccino et al. (2005)
found that listening to action-related sentences modulated activity
in the motor system. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded
from hand and foot muscles were specifically modulated by handrelated and foot-related action sentences respectively.
More support is provided by the fact that lesions can lead to
the loss of multiple categories that share perceptual properties
(Simmons and Barsalou, 2003). For instance, Adolphs et al. (2000)
found that damage to the somatosensory cortex was correlated with
deficits in the visual recognition of facial expressions. The authors
propose that simulation of producing facial expressions is involved
in the recognition of facial expressions in others. A selective deficit
in action word processing has been found patients with motor neuron disease (Bak et al., 2001). A word of caution is needed, though,
because modality-specific damage does not explain the categoryspecific deficits of all patients (Caramazza and Mahon, 2006).
A body of brain imaging data support an embodied approach
to concepts. Martin et al. (1996), for example, found increased
activation in visual areas with categories that appear to rely heavily
on visual information for identification. Simmons et al. (2007) find
evidence of a common neural substrate for color perception and
verification of object-associated color (e.g., taxi-yellow). Using a
visual naming task, Chao and Martin (2000) found increased activity in motor areas with highly manipulable objects when compared
to less manipulable objects. Hauk et al. (2004) had participants
read individual words that referred to actions involving leg, arm,
and head movements such as lick, pick, and kick. They found that
reading each type of action word produced increased activation
in successively in the regions of M1 associated with performing
the relevant movements. In a task where participants listened to
action-related sentences, Tettamanti et al. (2005) found increased
activation in effector-specific premotor and motor areas.
In sum, a number of studies using different experimental paradigms and techniques implicate sensorimotor representations in
various cognitive tasks. Positing perceptual symbols provides an
economical and robust explanation for a diverse set of observed
phenomena, including reaction times, the functional character of
some neuropathologies, and neural activation patterns in response
to certain cognitive tasks.
Challenges to the evidence

Aside from the problem of abstraction, which will be discussed
in the next section, the inference to embodied cognition from the
available evidence faces two major challenges. The first concerns
how the debate is framed. Machery (2007, 2010) argues that amodal theories are not monolithic, and there are conceivable amodal
systems that would fit with the available evidence. In a similar vein,
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) contend that the activity in sensoriomotor areas observed in many experiments could be the result
of spreading activation from amodal representations. The ability
to offer amodal explanations for the available evidence undermines
some of the hyperbolic rhetoric used by supporters of embodied
cognition. Too often, such supporters claim that the empirical
predictions of embodied and amodal approaches sharply diverge.
What Machery and Mahon and Caramazza demonstrate is that the
empirical decision between the embodied and amodal approaches
may be more difficult than some have advertised. This point seems
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well taken; the issue will ultimately be decided by which approach is
best supported by the evidence. The defeasible position of this paper
is that the available evidence favors an embodied approach.
The second challenge is that the neuroimaging evidence does not
exclude the presence of amodal representations. Indeed, many of the
cited imaging experiments find modulation of activity in multiple
brain areas. Several commentators (e.g., Weiskopf, 2007; Chatterjee,
2010; Machery, 2010) point out that a number of the neuroimaging studies cited in support of embodied cognition actually find
modulated activity in brain areas that are near – but not identical
to – areas used for perceptual and motor processing. This is a serious challenge to a philosophical position known as neo-empiricism
(Prinz, 2002). A core tenet of this position is that all conceptual
representations are modality-specific (Machery, 2010). Against this
universal claim, evidence suggesting that some conceptual representations are located within areas outside of areas used for perceptual
and motor processing is damning. It is not clear, though, that such
evidence undermines a simulation-based embodied approach.
On some level, the distributed activation patterns found in the
literature fit with the theory of perceptual symbols. Barsalou (2003)
proposes that long-term memory integration processes underlie the
ability create appropriate simulations. Such processes are needed to
explain our ability to generalize and abstract away from particular
exemplars and generate the right simulations on a given occasion.
This move offloads significant aspects of conceptualization into
non-perceptual association areas or convergence zones (Damasio
and Damasio, 1994). It also raises the question of whether or not
these areas contain amodal symbols. Barsalou et al. (2003, p. 87)
concede that “…conjunctive neurons in convergence zones constitute a somewhat amodal mechanism for capturing and re-enacting
modality-specific states” but then go on to point out that alternative explanations of the activity of these neurons are available that
do not require amodal symbols. They then suggest that we should
pragmatically assume that convergence zones do not contain amodal symbols until evidence suggests otherwise.
This is not a satisfying solution to the challenge posed by activation in convergence zones because it is provisional and ad hoc.
Fortunately, there is a better way to meet this challenge: we can
adopt a more liberal definition of an embodied concept. The fundamental intuition behind the embodied approach is that cognition
is fundamentally integrated with perceptual and motor systems.
Such integration does not in and of itself exclude supramodal or
even amodal representations as long as the function of these representations is to engage appropriate simulations and not to act as
independent conceptual representations. I would even go further
and suggest that the very modal/amodal distinction fits poorly
with an integrated embodied perspective because it presupposes
a clean distinction between cognition and perception. From an
embodied perspective, no such clean distinction exists. If I am right,
then evidence of relevant neural activity in areas near to, but not
directly associated with, a particular sensorimotor modality is not
unequivocally incompatible with an embodied approach.

The problem of abstraction
A well-known limitation of the evidence for embodied concepts
is that it primarily involves concrete or highly imageable concepts
(Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2007; Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2008;
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Dove, 2009). This is problematic because, although it is not difficult
to imagine how embodiment might help us acquire concrete concepts, it is difficult to see how it can be anything but a hindrance with
abstract concepts such as DEMOCRACY, ELECTRON, ENTROPY,
JUSTICE, NUMBER, PATIENCE, and TRUTH. Representations
grounded in sensorimotor systems do not seem to be well suited to
representing abstract intentional contents. For this reason, abstract
concepts remain a critical issue for embodied cognition. More is at
stake than simply the reach of this approach. For instance, Mahon
and Caramazza (2008, p. 60) use the challenge posed by abstract
concepts to support a parsimony argument in support of an amodal
approach to concepts:
Given that an embodied theory of cognition would have to admit
‘disembodied’ cognitive processes in order to account for the representation of abstract concepts, why have a special theory just for
concepts of concrete objects and actions?

While I am not convinced that such parsimony arguments have
much force (the history of psychology is rich with highly economical failed theories), the core premise of this argument – i.e.,
that abstract concepts require disembodied cognition – needs to
be examined.
Three embodied approaches to abstract concepts

Supporters of embodied concepts have begun to address the problem of abstraction. Three main approaches exist in the literature
(for a review see Glenberg et al., 2008). Although each approach
has some empirical support, there are reasons to believe that
these approaches do not provide a full solution to the problem
of abstraction.
The first and most well established approach involves metaphoric extension. This approach originally emerged from work
in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987).
The core idea is that we often understand one conceptual domain
metaphorically in terms of another. Often, these metaphors are
shaped by image schemas formed from our bodily interactions,
linguistic experience, and historical context. For instance, the concept of ARGUMENT may be understood in terms of the concept
of WAR. The primary evidence for this approach is our use of linguistic metaphors. Some recent behavioral studies, though, provide
evidence of the metaphorical use of space to represent abstract
concepts. For instance, Boroditsky and colleagues (Boroditsky and
Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008) provide evidence
that some temporal judgments rely on spatial representations.
Richardson et al. (2003) attempted to ascertain whether or not
comprehending abstract verbs, such as argue and respect, automatically activates spatial image schemas with a specific orientation
(horizontal for argue and vertical for respect). Participants listened
to short sentences while engaged in either a visual discrimination
task or a picture memory task. Reaction times suggest that there
was an interaction between the horizontal/vertical orientation of
the image schema and the horizontal/vertical orientation of the
visual stimuli.
The second approach is similar in spirit to the first but focuses
on the importance of action schemas (Glenberg and Robertson,
1999). The core idea of this approach is that some abstract language
is grounded in motor processes. A primary source of evidence is
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the action–sentence compatibility effect or ACE (Glenberg and
Kaschak, 2002). Glenberg and Kaschak found that reaction times
decreased when response direction (a button press either away/
toward the body) and the implied direction of either concrete action
sentences (e.g., Andy gave you the pizza/You gave Andy the pizza)
or abstract transfer sentences (e.g., Liz told you a story/You told Liz
a story) matched. They suggest that the ACE is the result of competition for resources by the motor planning associated with the
action and the language processing associated with the sentence.
Adding to the behavioral research, Glenberg et al. (2008) recently
provide neurophysiological evidence that comprehension of both
object-transfer and abstract-transfer sentences modulates motor
system activity.
The third approach proposes that, contrary to our intuitions,
some abstract concepts involve situated simulations (Barsalou,
1999). This approach is supported by evidence from feature generation experiments. In a preliminary study, Barsalou and WiemerHastings (2005) asked participants to generate typical properties for
three abstract concepts (TRUTH, FREEDOM, and INVENTION),
three concrete concepts (BIRD, CAR, and SOFA) and three intermediate concepts (COOKING, FARMING, and CARPETING).
The authors report two core findings: that participants generated
situational properties with both concrete and abstract concepts and
that participants tended to generate more event and introspective
properties with abstract concepts. They propose that abstract and
concrete concepts are generally associated with different aspects of
situations: abstract concepts tend to focus on social aspects while
concrete concepts tend to focus on physical entities and actions. In
a more fully realized experiment employing similar methodology,
Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) found that participants tended
to produce fewer entity properties, more introspective properties,
and more relational properties with abstract concepts than with
concrete concepts.
How promising are these approaches? Let us consider each
in turn. There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of metaphorical projection solution to the problem of abstraction. First,
there are reasons to question the force of the linguistic evidence
supporting this approach. It is just not clear that such linguistic
patterns directly reflect conceptual structure. Indeed, alternative
explanations of metaphors that do not require positing metaphoric
representations are available (Murphy, 1997). Another problem is
that this proposal seems developmentally implausible (Murphy,
1996). For example, it seems unlikely that an understanding of the
complexities of war is required for the acquisition of the concept
of an argument. Furthermore, evidence suggests that children’s
understanding of metaphor remains quite poor before the ages of
8–10 (Winner et al., 1976). Finally, there is an inherent difficulty
faced by the attempt to capture conceptual content in terms of
metaphor: while a metaphor enables us to highlight the similarities
between two concepts, it cannot capture the important differences.
Arguments, after all, are not really wars. Recognizing the appropriate connections between a perceptual experience and what it is
being metaphorically extended to cover seems to require a prior
understanding of the concept. Without such an understanding, it
is difficult to see how one can arrive at a correct interpretation of
a metaphor. The very ubiquity of spatial metaphor undermines
its potential for representing a specific abstract concept such as

www.frontiersin.org

Embodied and dis-embodied cognition

RESPECT. This ubiquity raises the question of whether a nonmetaphoric understanding of the target concept is needed to anchor
these metaphoric uses.
Although the action schema approach is similar in spirit to
the metaphorical projection approach, it enjoys some advantages
over the metaphorical projection approach. For one, the evidence
offered in support of this approach seems more substantial and less
equivocal. Second, the developmental picture behind this approach
seems more plausible. It fits with the developmental evidence suggesting that concrete or highly imageable event words are easier
for young children to acquire than abstract ones (Maguire and
Dove, 2008). Despite these advantages, the action schema approach
faces some of the same challenges as the metaphoric projection
approach. For instance, the apparent representational flexibility of
action schemas raises the question of how it is possible to acquire
the relevant abstract concepts. If the same action schema underlies
various concepts, how are the differences between these concepts
represented? Another problem is that it is difficult to imagine how
action schemas can account for all abstract concepts. For instance,
it is not clear how they might handle concepts such as ELECTRON,
NUMBER, and TRUTH.
Finally, consider the situated simulation approach. The
body of evidence cited in support of it is admittedly quite thin.
More importantly, this evidence may not resolve the issue of
the embodiment of conceptual representations. A supporter of
amodal symbols could well argue that disembodied symbols
are needed to account for our ability to represent the social
and relational aspects of situations. In the end, the most serious problem facing the situated simulations proposal is that a
particular abstract concept such as DEMOCRACY is not likely
to be associated with a simple set of sensorimotor experiences
(Dove, 2009).
In sum, current attempts to offer an embodied solution to the
problem of abstraction appear suffer from two weaknesses: insufficiency and incompleteness. The approaches appear to be insufficient because they do not provide a full explanation of the concepts
to which they apply. They appear incomplete because they do not
seem to capture all abstract concepts. This is not to say that these
proposals have no merit. Instead, I suggest that each has some
promise and empirical support, but, ultimately, more is needed to
explain our ability to abstract and generalize.
Dis-embodiment

Supporters of an embodied approach to concepts tend to treat the
problem of abstraction as a collection of exceptions. The task then
becomes to explain a subset of these exceptions using the theoretical
techniques and experimental designs of the research program of
embodied cognition. This effort ignores the fact that abstraction
represents a general problem for embodied concepts. What we need
to explain is our ability to go beyond embodied experience. Earlier
we emphasized how grounding our concepts in action and perception systems may help us acquire conceptual content. Now, we need
to acknowledge that such grounding has potential costs associated
with it. In particular, sensorimotor simulations seem ill-suited for
representing conceptual content that is not closely tied to particular
experiences. The problem is that some concepts appear to require
what we might call ungrounded representations.
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The orthodox position within cognitive science, clearly expressed
in the quote from Mahon and Caramazza given above, is that such
“disembodied” concepts require amodal representations. If we look
at the general features of the proposed embodied solutions to the
problem of abstraction – particularly the metaphor projection
and action schema approaches – a different theoretical possibility emerges. Each of these approaches proposes ways in which
embodied representations associated with a certain experiential/
cognitive domain can be used to refer to objects and events outside of that domain. To capture this idea, I am going coin a new
term: dis-embodiment. A mental symbol is dis-embodied if (1) it
is embodied but (2) this embodiment is arbitrarily related to its
semantic content. In other words, a mental symbol is dis-embodied
if it involves sensorimotor simulations of experiences that are not
associated with its semantic content. The dash in the middle of this
term is intended to distinguish this notion from the more general
notion of disembodiment to which Mahon and Caramazza appeal.
What I want to suggest is that the proposals outlined above are on
the right track, but they fail to provide a general solution to the
problem of abstraction. Below, I argue that natural language itself
serves as a form of dis-embodied cognition and plays an extensive
role in enabling us to acquire and use abstract concepts.

Language as a form of dis-embodied cognition
One way to approach the problem of abstraction is to scrutinize
the abstract/concrete distinction (Scorolli, 2009). A number of
researchers suggest that there are qualitative differences between
abstract and concrete concepts. For example, Barr and Caplan
(1987) propose that a meaningful distinction can be drawn between
categories that are primarily represented by “extrinsic” features
(those associated with relations between two or more entities) and
those that are represented by “intrinsic” features (those associated
with individual entities). Based on property generation studies,
Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) propose a two-factor account
in which abstract concepts are both less contextually specific and
predominately associated with social aspects of situations. Crutch
and Warrington (2005) propose a qualitative distinction in which
concrete concepts are organized primarily around similarity and
abstract concepts are organized around semantic association. A
recent eye-tracking experiment suggests that these representational
differences emerge during on-line word-recognition (Deñabeitia
et al., 2009). Participants were presented with visual displays that
included a target picture of item that was a semantic associate of
an abstract or concrete word. Their eye-movements were recorded
as they listened to the relevant words. They tended to fixate more
(and earlier) on depicted objects that were associates of abstract
words than associates of concrete words. Overall, evidence of a
qualitative distinction between abstract and concrete concepts is
growing. What is the source of this distinction? I propose that it
arises from an asymmetry between the types of representations
employed by abstract and concrete concepts. While concrete
concepts generally depend on both linguistic and non-linguistic
perceptual symbols, abstract concepts tend to rely primarily on
linguistic perceptual symbols.
Natural language has a number of design features commonly
associated with amodal symbol systems that make it well suited to
representing abstract concepts. Indeed, natural language is often
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held up as a paradigmatic example of an amodal symbol system.
Three design features are particularly important. The first is the
inherent representational arbitrariness of words and morphemes.
There is, for example, no intrinsic similarity or other extralinguistic
connection of the English word cat to the category of cats. Indeed,
other languages associate phonetically and graphemically different
words with the same category. Furthermore, the phonemic similarity of cat to cap carries no weight with respect to the contents of
these words. The second is its stimulus-independence (Chomsky,
1966). Competent speakers are able to produce linguistic utterances
in a self-generated fashion that is not an immediate response to
proximal environmental stimulation. The third is its systematicity
(Fodor, 1975; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker, 1994). The ability
to produce a sentence such as Joni loves Chachi seems to come hand
in hand with the ability to form other sentences such as Chachi
loves Joni and Jenny loves Chachi, etc. A common explanation of
these design features is that natural language amounts to a syntactically recombinable symbol system. While there are disagreements
concerning the cognitive architecture that underlies our linguistic
competence, a large body of linguistic research suggests that the
morphosyntactic structure of language is at least characterizable
in terms of a productive grammar.
Now the mere fact that natural language is stimulus-independent and systematic does not sufficiently distinguish it from garden
variety perceptual symbols. One of the achievements of perceptual
symbol theory is that it demonstrates how a simulation-based symbol system might have these properties (Barsalou and Prinz, 1997).
Stimulus-independence and systematicity alone cannot establish an
advantage of verbal over non-verbal representations with respect to
abstract contents. Natural language must bring something else to
the table. In a philosophical exploration of possible conceptions of
animal and human cognition, Camp (2009) suggests that we should
view stimulus-independence and recombinability as degree properties. She then argues that natural language enhances these features
in at least four ways. First, natural language is likely to increase the
range of thoughts that any one individual may entertain because it
enables one to hear the thoughts of others. Second, natural language
makes it easier to reproduce the same thought in different situations because of its lack of context-sensitivity. Third, the manifest
syntactic structure of natural language highlights the potential
recombinality of thoughts and thus encourages us to entertain a
wider of thoughts. Finally, natural language provides a sufficiently
rich expressive medium to allow one to represent truth-values and
inferential relations among thoughts. These enhancements mean
that a creature with language is likely to enjoy a general cognitive
advantage over a creature that does not.
A primary benefit afforded by a natural language is that it
provides a representational system that can play the integrative
role traditionally associated with amodal symbols. Consider the
following argument for the necessity of amodal representations.
After recognizing the existence of independent sensorimotor codes,
Jackendoff (1992, p. 3) contends that amodal representations are
necessary because “…none of these forms of input and output
information suffices to explain the way that we understand the
world in terms of objects, their motions, our actions on them,
and so forth.” The general idea is that amodal representations are
needed to capture generalizations about entities and events that
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go beyond the information contained within specific modalities.
Amodal representations provide a means of gathering and integrating information from different modalities as well as transferring
information between distinct sensorimotor codes. Because linguistic representations have the design features outlined above, they
can also carry out this function (Carruthers, 2002).
I propose that when an individual acquires a natural language,
she acquires a representational system that is different in some
important respects from the multimodal, context-sensitive embodied symbol systems that exist independently of language. The acquisition of natural language, in other words, enhances and extends
her representational abilities by giving her access to a context-free
and arbitrary symbol system. This symbol system is independent
of, and yet interacts with, other embodied symbols.
This proposal requires a revisionist conception of linguistic competence. Standard theories of linguistic competence are thoroughly
amodal. Linguists have identified structural regularities at several
levels of analysis, including phonology, morphology, syntax, and to
some degree logical form or semantics. Knowledge relating to these
levels is thought to be contained with language-specific functional
modules (Fodor, 1983) and is generally thought to be couched
in amodal codes. Comprehension involves translating perceptual
information into these codes and production involves translating
information in these codes into motor representations. The revisionist approach taken in this essay is that the process of achieving
competence in a specific natural language involves acquiring the
ability to generate appropriate simulations of linguistic experience.
To be successful, these simulations must comport with the structural regularities at the different levels of analysis. They will not,
however, depend on knowledge contained with an amodal symbol
system. Three points about this revisionist proposal are especially
important. The first is that it is neutral with respect to the issue
of the degree to which linguistic competence is innate or learned.
This proposal has to do with the format of the representations
associated with this competence and not how it is acquired. The
second is that, despite superficial appearances, this is not an inner
speech view. The claim is that linguistic competence is contained
within a system for generating perceptual symbols. These symbols
consist of neurophysiological simulations that can be partial, selective, and unconscious. The third important point is that there is no
independent lexical semantic code. The core thesis of this paper is
that concepts are couched in two types of simulation-based representations: those associated with non-linguistic experience of the
world and those associated with experience of language. Because
simulations are detailed and often complex, linguistic perceptual
symbols may exhibit structure at the various levels of analysis (phonology, morphology, syntax, etc.).
Thinking in words

Despite the clear differences between embodied and orthodox
approaches to cognition, both adopt a similar view of the relationship between language and thought. Both see language as a medium
of communication rather than a medium of thought. According to
both, language expresses underlying thoughts that are encoded in
some other semantic code. Within traditional cognitive science, this
code is typically taken to be a language-like amodal symbol system
(Fodor, 1975). Within embodied cognition, this code is thought
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to consist of embodied representations grounded in action and
perception mechanisms. Glenberg et al. (2008, p. 4) offer the following summary of what researchers mean when they say that
language is embodied:
Linguistic symbols are embodied to the extent that: (a) the meaning
of the symbol (the interpretant) to the agent depends on activity
in systems also used for perception, action, and emotion, and (b)
reasoning about meaning, including combinatorial processes of
sentence understanding requires use of those systems.

The idea is that linguistic symbols have meaning because they
dynamically activate sensorimotor representations associated with
interacting with the world. On this account, linguistic symbols are
intermediaries that do not directly have meaning or participate in
reasoning about meaning.
I suggest that language plays two roles in our cognitive lives.
One role is to engage sensorimotor simulations of interacting with
the world. In this role, language serves primarily as a medium of
communication. A second role is to elicit and engage symbolically
mediated associations and inferences. Our concepts are not merely
couched in sensorimotor representations but also in linguistic
representations (words, phrases, sentences). Conceptual content
is captured in part by the relationships of linguistic representations
with other linguistic representations. These relationships may be
merely associative or they may be inferential. On this view, a concept such as DOG will, not only be represented on a given occasion
by multimodal simulations associated with interacting with dogs,
but will also be represented in terms of related linguistic words,
phrases, or sentences. This idea has a clear affinity with inferential
role or conceptual role semantics (Harman, 1982; Block, 1986). This
philosophical theory of mental content holds that the meaning of a
concept is determined by its functional role within the cognitive life
of an individual. My proposal is distinct from this theory because
it adds the further requirement that the associative and inferential
relationships be couched in language-based simulations.
One source of evidence for the view that internalized natural language can itself serve as a symbolic form of cognition is
the effectiveness of statistical models that derive the meaning of
words through statistical computations applied to large corpuses
of text (Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2008). A prominent example of
this type of model is Latent Semantic Analysis or LSA (Landauer
and Dumais, 1997). The idea behind LSA is that the aggregate of
all the linguistic contexts in which a given word does and does
not appear constrains semantic-relatedness. LSA has shown some
effectiveness with respect to modeling a variety of linguistic tasks
(Landauer et al., 1998). For example, an LSA model performed at
a comparable level on the vocabulary portion of the Test of English
as a Foreign Language to a large sample of students applying for
college entrance in the United States from non-English speaking
countries (Landauer and Dumais, 1997). Even if we grant that this
particular model is psychologically implausible, it demonstrates the
potential of a language-based representational system.
Theoretical influences

I propose that our concepts are encoded in at least two types of
semantic representations: one type employing embodied sensorimotor representations associated with our experience of the world
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and the other type employing dis-embodied sensorimotor representations associated with our experience of language. Other types
may exist. Gesture, for instance, might form an independent semantic representational system (Goldin-Meadow, 2003). This pluralistic
embodied proposal has clear similarities with some previous theories. Highlighting the similarities – and the differences – between it
and these theories should help clarify its central claims.
This proposal overlaps somewhat with another recent attempt to
offer an embodied solution to the problem of abstraction. Borghi
and Cimatti (2009) argue that supporters of embodied cognition
have paid too little attention to the embodied social experience
associated with language. They propose that there is a qualitative
distinction to be made, not between two different mental processes,
but rather between two different cognitive sources of grounding:
one that depends crucially on direct sensorimotor experience and
another that depends crucially on linguistic experience. Both of
these sources can be useful in the acquisition of any concept but the
acquisition of concrete concepts is likely to depend more on direct
sensorimotor experience and the acquisition of abstract concepts
is more likely to depend on linguistic experience. This distinction
seems important and necessary. I suggest that it falls short, however,
because it does not appropriately emphasize the importance of
the computational properties of natural language. While I agree
that linguistic experience is an important source of socially derived
information about the world, I maintain that the structural properties of natural language contribute to its effectiveness in representing abstract concepts. My account differs from Borghi and Cimatti’s
because it holds that the acquisition of language creates a new
dis-embodied semantic system, one that has many of the properties usually associated with the amodal symbol systems favored by
traditional cognitive science. In other words, natural language on
my view is not merely another source of information about the
world but is also another way of thinking about the world.
My core thesis is that language is an internalized amodal symbol
system that is built on an embodied substrate. As such, it extends
our cognitive reach and helps us overcome the problem of abstraction. This idea is inspired in part by Andy Clark’s view of language
as a kind of cognitive scaffolding that provides cognitive benefits
that would not otherwise be available to us. Clark (2008, p. 47)
summarizes these benefits in the following passage:
The computational value of a public system of essentially contextfree, arbitrary symbols, lies… in the way such a system can push,
pull, tweak, cajole, and eventually cooperate with various nonarbitrary, modality-rich, context-sensitive forms of biologically
basic encoding.

Clark’s claim is that natural language augments the cognitive abilities of an embodied mind. The core idea is that natural language
is a cognitively useful symbol system, not because it mirrors the
structure of our underlying thoughts, but because it does not. Clark
makes much of the arbitrariness of linguistic symbols. Although the
arbitrariness of the relationship between words and their semantic contents is well known, one might think that “forms of biologically basic encoding” are equally arbitrary. However, as we saw
above in the context of the symbol grounding problem, there is a
sense in which perceptual symbols are not arbitrary because they
contain sensorimotor representations that enjoy a non-cognitive
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causal relationship with objects and events. Clark (2008) argues
that language helps extend our cognitive abilities in at least three
distinct but related ways: first, the very act of labeling objects and
events provides a means of discovering increasingly abstract patterns in nature; second, the ability to recall and react to structured
sentences enables us to acquire new skills and capacities, and third,
our language abilities partially underwrite our ability to reflect
on and influence the contents of our own thinking. Because he
is primarily interested in simply establishing that language can in
fact extend our cognitive abilities, Clark focuses on a collection of
empirically based examples that seem to demonstrate cognitive
extension. One of the most established of these is the apparent way
in which verbal counting helps children acquire an understanding
of positive integers (Dehaene, 1999; Carey and Sarnecka, 2006).
Where my account diverges from Clark’s is with respect to
scope. I contend that the sort of scaffolding he discusses is not
limited to specific concepts or cognitive domains. Instead, acquiring a natural language extends our abilities to acquire concepts
across the board. This is not simply because it offers a means of
accessing socially derived information but also because it offers new
representational powers. I suggest that most concepts depend to
some significant degree on information represented in internalized
natural language.
Clark may or may not be sympathetic with this general point, but
there is no indication that he connects this scaffolding effect to the
qualitative distinction between abstract and concrete concepts.
This brings us to perhaps the single greatest influence of the
theory outlined in this essay: Dual Coding Theory or DCT (Paivio,
1986). This theory posits two independent cognitive subsystems,
one employing symbolic verbal representations and the other
employing analog non-verbal representations. Sadoski and Paivio
(2004, p. 1340) write:
A basic premise of DCT is that all mental representations retain some
of the concrete qualities of the external experiences from which they
derive. These experiences can be linguistic or non-linguistic. Their
different characteristics develop into two separate mental systems,
or codes, one specialized for representing and processing language
(the verbal code) and one for processing non-linguistic objects and
events (the non-verbal code).

The focus in DCT on the dynamic relationship between experience and mental representations seems to be in keeping with the
basic tenets of embodied cognition. One might even reasonably
see DCT as a precursor to the embodied cognition movement.
However, an important aspect of DCT, i.e., its emphasis on language as an independent symbol system, has not generally been
taken up by embodied cognition. To a certain degree, my account
can be seen as an attempt to recapture an important insight from
DCT within an embodied framework. It is important, however, to
recognize that the result of this effort is not simply a recapitulation of DCT. There are some important differences between the
account developed here and DCT. First, DCT claims that mental
images are the basic constituents of the verbal and non-verbal
systems. My account views perceptual symbols as the basic units.
This is significant because perceptual symbol system theory represents an explicit attempt to avoid the weaknesses associated with
image-based theories of concepts. Perceptual symbols differ from
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mental images in a number of important ways: for instance, they
need not be conscious, they can be schematic, and they are often
multi-modal. Second, DCT and my theory differ with respect to
the nature of the mental representations associated with language.
According to DCT, they are a special class of mental images that
are made up from different basic elements (logogens) than the
basic elements of non-verbal representations (imagens). On my
account, all conceptual representations consist of perceptual
symbols. Linguistic representations are distinguished form nonlinguistic ones by the fact that they are an internalization of an
external symbol system.
In the end, the view advocated in this essay brings together ideas
from a number of different theories and combines them in a novel
way. While it clearly owes a debt to these previous views, it stands
or falls on its own.

Empirical evidence
We began the last section with the acknowledgment of the seriousness of the problem of abstraction. We now have a theoretical
picture of how language might help explain this ability: language
might extend our cognitive abilities in such a way that enables us
to have some of the benefits of an amodal symbol system. This
theoretical picture rests on two independent hypotheses: (1) that
language processing involves sensorimotor simulation and (2) that
linguistic representations play an important role in our ability to
abstract and generalize.
Language processing involves perceptual symbols

Given the dynamic nature of linguistic communication, the idea
that language processing involves perceptual symbols seems attractive. After all, most linguistic communication is time-constrained
and would seem to require the integration of action, perception,
and cognition. Below, I survey some of the evidence favoring
this hypothesis.
The first reason to think language processing might involve
sensorimotor simulations is a negative one: the project to locate
self-contained language areas of the brain has not succeeded.
Ever since the work of Broca and Wernicke in the late nineteenth
century (Finger, 1994), the classical localizationist position has
been that subcomponents of language are represented and processed in bounded and specialized cortical regions (Geschwind,
1970). One of the primary sources of evidence for this perspective has been the study of aphasic syndromes resulting from
focal brain injuries (for a review see Saffran, 2000). Researchers,
however, have begun to move away from strict localization and
toward the view that language requires the activity of a number
of spatially distinct brain regions. This shift has occurred in
response to several forms of evidence. For one, neuroimaging
studies indicate that widely distributed brain areas are active
in language processing (Posner and Raichle, 1994). Another
reason for this shift is the fact that the association of grammatical processing with Broca’s area has broken down to a large
degree (Grodzinsky, 2000). For instance, there is evidence of
some retained grammatical knowledge in Broca’s aphasics (Bates
and Wulfeck, 1989; Bates et al., 1991). In addition, grammatical deficits have been found in Wernicke’s aphasics and other
clinical populations (Dick et al., 2001). It also appears that
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g rammatical deficits are associated with damage throughout
the left perisylvian cortex (Caplan et al., 1996). Finally, recent
evidence suggests that Broca’s area itself might have multiple
functions. For example, a number have studies have implicated
in action-related tasks (Thoenissen et al., 2002; Nishitani et al.,
2005). In sum, evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology suggests that language processing is widely distributed in the brain and involves a number of sensorimotor
areas. Although this distribution is not logically incompatible
with an amodal approach, it fits well with the idea that language
processing involves sensorimotor simulations.
A second, more direct reason to think that language processing might involve perceptual symbols is that there is evidence
of functional links between motor and perception circuits with
the left perisylvian cortex (Pulvermüller, 2005). For example,
there is evidence that listening to speech modulates tongue
muscle responses (Fadiga et al., 2002). This sort of evidence is
often seen as supporting the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman and Whalen, 2000) or the direct realist theory
(Fowler et al., 2003). Critics of these theories argue that auditory
areas alone might be sufficient for perceiving speech (e.g., Toni
et al., 2008). If true, this would rule out a strongly action-based
account of speech perception in which speech perception necessarily involves motor processing. However, it does not rule
out a weaker view that speech recognition generally involves
multimodal perceptual symbols.
A third reason to suppose that language processing involves perceptual symbols is that several studies implicate active integration
of multimodal information in on-line language processing. It is
well established that visual input can influence phonemic speechprocessing (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). A large body of eyetracking experiments shows the manifold ways in which visual
information can be continuously integrated with auditory information during the processing of speech (Spivey and Richardson,
2009). Visual information has been shown to influence language
comprehension at various levels of linguistic analysis, including
word-recognition (Allopenna et al., 1998), syntactic processing
(Tanenhaus et al., 1995), and thematic role assignment (Altmann
and Kamide, 1999). Consider a study involving syntactic ambiguity (Spivey et al., 2002; Spivey and Richardson, 2009). Participants
were presented with a four-quadrant display of real objects and
instructed to carry out actions. The display on one condition contained (going clockwise from the upper left quadrant) a spoon
on a napkin, a bare napkin, a bowl, and a pen. The participants
were instructed to “Put the spoon on the napkin in the bowl.”
Eye-tracking evidence indicates that subjects often fixate on the
irrelevant bare napkin before fixating on the bowl and carrying
out the action. This suggests that they initially misparse the initial
prepositional phrase as syntactically attached to the verb. This effect
did not occur with a similar display in which two spoons appear,
one on a napkin and one not on a napkin (replacing the pen in
the earlier display).
A fourth reason to think that language processing might involve
perceptual symbols is the employment of perceptual areas in language processing among people with congenital perceptual deficits. For example, neuroimaging studies find increased activation
in auditory areas when congenitally deaf individuals view signs
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(Petito et al., 2000). Similarly, some primary visual areas show
increased activation when congenitally blind individuals read
Braille (Sadato et al., 1996).
Taken together, these various bodies of evidence suggest that
language processing is much more integrated with action and
perception systems than was previously assumed by researchers. It should be acknowledged, however, that this evidence is
only suggestive and not conclusive. One could maintain that this
evidence does not falsify the hypothesis that language processing is handled by amodal symbols since the implicated activity in sensorimotor systems could be associated with spreading
activation and not be constitutive of language processing. As I
mentioned earlier in the essay, this is a general problem faced by
any embodied hypothesis. Ultimately, the issue is an empirical
one, and unfortunately the evidence currently available does not
completely settle matters.
Given this uncertainty, it seems worthwhile to consider what
would happen if it turns out that language processing is indeed
handled by an amodal symbol system of the sort posited by the
current orthodoxy. This would turn the hypothesis that language is
a form of dis-embodied cognition into the hypothesis that language
is a form of disembodied cognition (non-hyphenated). It would
result in a different kind of hybrid theory, one in which concepts are
represented by both multimodal perceptual symbols and amodal
linguistic symbols. Although I am promoting the dis-embodied
view in this essay, the second view is an intriguing and compelling
alternative (for general arguments in favor of a hybrid approach
see Dove, 2009; Kemmerer, 2010).
Imageability reconsidered

Imageability effects provide support for the account developed in
this essay. Typically, imageability is defined as the ease with which
a word gives rise to a sensory-motor mental image (Paivio, 1971).
Imageability is a broader concept than concreteness because it
includes sensory images of bodily states and motor images. It
is generally recognized that imageability better captures the relevant phenomena and supports broader generalizations. Highly
reliable imageability ratings on number scales have been gathered
for linguistic concepts by number of researchers (Toglia and
Battig, 1978; Bird et al., 2001). Traditionally, cognitive scientists
examined imageability in terms of processing advantages for high
imageable concepts over low imageable ones in several cognitive
tasks. For instance, lexical access has been shown to be quicker for
highly imageable words than for abstract ones (Coltheart et al.,
1980) and highly imageable words are recalled more quickly in
memory tasks than abstract words (Paivio, 1986; Wattenmaker
and Shoben, 1987).
Two major theories dominate the literature: the DCT (Paivio,
1971, 1986) and the context-availability theory (Schwanenflugel
and Shoben, 1983). According to the DCT, words with low imageability are associated primarily with verbal representations while
highly imageable words are associated with both verbal representations and perceptual ones. Imageability effects are then explained in
terms of the greater availability of perceptually encoded information. According to the context-availability theory, highly imageable
words are more closely linked to relevant contextual knowledge in
semantic networks than less imageable concepts. In other words,
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highly imageable words have greater contextual information stored
in semantic memory, and imageability effects are to be explained by
the facilitation of processing associated with increased activation
in these networks. On this approach, the reason that participants
respond more quickly in a lexical decision task to a word such as
“fingertip” than to one such as “idea” is that the former has more
semantic associations than the latter.
Evidence suggests that both theories are right, depending on the
task. I am going to focus on the evidence for the DCT because this
evidence has more relevance to the claims in this essay.
Consider first neuropsychological case studies. Several research
teams describe aphasic patients with significant left hemisphere
damage who exhibit a selective semantic impairment for high
imageable words (Berndt et al., 2002; Bird et al., 2003; Crepaldi
et al., 2006). Patients with a selective semantic impairment for
low imageable words are less common but have also been found
(Marshall et al., 1996; Luzzatti et al., 2002). This double dissociation suggests that, at least at some level, the semantic processing of
concepts with low imageability is functionally independent from
the semantic processing of concepts with high imageability.
A number of event-related potential (ERP) experiments support a neuroanatomical distinction between concepts of high and
low imageability. For instance, Holcomb et al. (1999) created a task
that involved manipulations of both context and concreteness.
ERP recordings were time-locked to sentence-final words in a
word-by-word reading task in which participants made semantic
congruency judgments (e.g., Armed robbery implies that the thief
used a weapon vs. armed robbery implies that the thief used a
rose). They found that sentence-final concrete words generated
a larger and more anterior N400 than sentence-final abstract
words in both contexts (see also Kounios and Holcomb, 1994;
West and Holcomb, 2000). Further studies have found contextindependent topographic effects associated with imageability in
single-word presentations (Kellenbach et al., 2002; Swaab et al.,
2002). Using two-word stimuli that involved a noun preceded by
either a concrete modifier or an abstract modifier (“green book”
vs. “engaging book”) in a visual half-field presentation, Huang
et al. (2010) found distinct hemispheric responses. Thus, ERP
studies employing diverse tasks support the notion that different
cognitive systems are associated with the semantic processing of
high and low imageable words.
Neuroimaging data supports the notion that neural activity is
modulated by imageability. A number of studies find that abstract
or low imageable words elicit greater activation than concrete
or high imageable words in superior regions of the left temporal lobe (Mellet et al., 1998; Giesbrecht et al., 2004; Noppeney
and Price, 2004; Binder et al., 2005; Sabsevitz et al., 2005) and
inferior regions of the left prefrontal cortex (Giesbrecht et al.,
2004; Noppeney and Price, 2004; Binder et al., 2005; Sabsevitz
et al., 2005; Goldberg et al., 2006). This evidence fits with imaging studies that implicate the left inferior frontal gyrus or IFG in
language processing (Bookheimer, 2002). When researchers make
the comparison in the reverse direction, the pattern is less clear.
Whereas some studies find no areas of increased activation (Kiehl
et al., 1999; Perani et al., 1999; Tyler et al., 2001; Grossman et al.,
2002; Noppeney and Price, 2004), others find increased activation
in right hemisphere areas (Mellet et al., 1998; Jessen et al., 2000;
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Binder et al., 2005; Sabsevitz et al., 2005). This divergence with
respect to activation patterns fits with the neuropsychological
observation that patients are more likely to have a selective deficit
for abstract or low imageable words than for concrete or high
imageable words.
Sabsevitz et al. (2005) carried out a particularly careful fMRI
study. Their study incorporated a larger sample (28 adults) than
previous studies and a task (judgment of semantic similarity)
that is more likely to elicit deep semantic processing than a more
superficial task, such as lexical decision. Participants were visually
presented with three words (e.g., cheetah, wolf, and tiger) in the
form of a triangle. The task was to decide which of the two bottom words was most semantically similar to the top word. In this
task, abstract nouns elicited greater activation in the left superior
temporal and left inferior frontal cortex than concrete nouns, while
concrete nouns elicited greater activation in a bilateral network of
association areas than abstract nouns.
The upshot of this survey is that imageability effects have
been found in multiple disciplines by investigators in a number
of labs using different research methodologies and measures.
These effects provide support for the notion that abstract or low
imageability concepts are processed somewhat differently than
concrete or high imageability concepts. Areas associated with
language processing appear to be more active during semantic
tasks associated with abstract or low imageability concepts. This
pattern of activation fits with both the hypothesis that language
is a dis-embodied form of cognition and the hypothesis that it
is an amodal form of cognition. The decision between these two
hypotheses turns on the role played by the observed activity in
language related areas. Is it part of linguistic sensorimotor simulations or is it part of amodal linguistic processes? This question
awaits further research.

Conclusion
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